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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MR. KEARNS' INABILITY TO ANSWER THE 
COMPLAINT WAS DUE TO EXCUSABLE 
NEGLECT 
Wells Fargo claims that Mr. Kearns "made a conscious decision to not answer the 
Complaint and knowingly accepted the consequences." Br. of Appellee p. 18. In support 
of this factually unsupported assertion, Wells Fargo launches into a personal attack on Mr. 
Kearns' integrity by questioning whether Mr. Kearns' son was in fact ill, draws attention to 
the trivial distinction between "several" days and three days, and imputes knowledge of the 
Complaint between unrelated firms on matters that are beyond the scope of 
representation. =n •**•? ' J 'J *-'f ' i , j - t f "- - Msnj *&* r r i ' Ifeinfr^^.nfi. un I^LM?- . I - J 
Wells Fargo attacks Mr. Kearns' integrity by questioning whether Mr. Kearns' son 
was even ill. By affidavit, both Miriam Kearns and Mr. Kearns testified that their newborn 
suffered from severe allergies and complications with his digestive system (R. 95-100). 
Each of the ailments Mr. Kearns' son suffered was life threatening. It is not only 
inappropriate, but also distasteful, for Wells Fargo to question whether Mr. Kearns'son was 
in fact ill. • i f . .^iv "< f - •/• • - ' ' ' ^ - -* • wn . 
Wells Fargo even goes to the extent of misconstruing case law to suggest that 
"inconvenience or press of personal or business affairs does not constitute excusable 
neglect." Br. of Appellee at 19, fn. 1. In Valley Leasing v. Houghton, 661 P.2d 959 (Utah 
1983), the Court stated m]ere inconvenience or the press of personal or business affairs 
is not deemed as an excuse for failure to appear at trial." Id. at 960 (citing Peterson v. 
1 
Crosier, 81 P. 860 (1905)). Contrary to Wells Fargo's interpretation of the Valley Leasing 
v. Houghton decision, presenting an excuse for failure to appear at trial is not equated with 
demonstrating excusable neglect for purposes of setting aside a default judgment. 
Additionally, Wells Fargo questions Mr. Kearns' integrity on the basis of the 
distinction between "several" days and three days. Paragraph 4 of Mr. Kearns' Affidavit 
provides: "Once Mrs. Kearns alerted me to the Complaint, I failed to file an answer or bring 
it to my attorney's attention due to my own preoccupation with my son's condition." (R. 96) 
Wells Fargo alleges that this statement is false given Mr. Kearns' Affidavit submitted in 
conjunction with his Trust dispute, dated August 26,1999. This distinction is trivial, at best 
and does not amount to an inaccurate statement. Several is commonly understood to 
consist of an indefinitely smalt number that is more than two but less than many. Given the 
widely used and accepted meaning of the word "several," Mr. Kearns correctly articulated 
the facts in paragraph 4 of his Affidavit. 
• Similarly, Wells Fargo alleges that Mr. Kearns' statement that he failed to bring the 
Complaint to his attorney's attention is false. Wells Fargo misconstrues the fact that Mr. 
Kearns informed the attorneys at Kirton & McConkie, who represented Mr. Kearns in the 
Thomas Kearns Trust Action, and equates that with informing his attorneys at Larsen & 
Mooney Law, the only firm he retained to represent him in matters stemming from the entry 
of the Default Judgment. In the Thomas Kearns Trust Action only, Mr. Kearns was 
represented by Eric C. Olson ("Mr. Olson") and Matthew K. Richards ("Mr. Richards") of 
Kirton & McConkie. That firm has never been retained in nor asked to represent Mr. 
Kearns in this matter. In the present litigation, Jerome H. Mooney ("Mr. Mooney") and 
2 
Mark A. Larsen ("Mr. Larsen") of Larsen & Mooney Law represent Mr. Kearns. Neither Mr, 
Mooney nor Mr. Larsen communicated with Mr. Olspn or Mr. Richards regarding this 
Complaint, and neither firm is imputed with knowledge that is beyond the scope of their 
representation. 
In short, rather than address the substantive issue of whether Mr. Kearns 
demonstrated excusable neglect, Wells Fargo chose to launch an unfounded personal 
attack on Mr. Kearns' integrity. 
POINT II 
MR. KEARNS' MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS TIMELY 
PURSUANT TO RULE 58A Of THE UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Wells Fargo's argument that Mr. Kearns' Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment is untimely is without merit and is unsupported by the record below. Rule 
58A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part: i - • •. 
When judgment entered; notation in j,. ; 
register of actions and judgment docket. 
Ajudgment is complete and shall be deemed 
entered for all purposes . . . when the same 
is signed and filed as herein above .<• ->©r- •- r. 
provided. The clerk shall immediately make 
a notation of the Judgment in the register of 
actions and the judgment docket. 
(Emphasis added) U.R.C.P. 58A(c)(1999). Under Rule 58A(c) "a judgment is 
complete and deemed entered for all purposes when the same is signed and filed." 
3 
In re Bundy's Estate v. Bundy, 241 P.2d 462, 467 (Utah 1952). • : * < ' . • • 
The court docket in this case reflects that even though Judge Peuler signed 
the Default Judgment on September 23, 1999, it was not filed by Judge Peuler's 
clerk nor entered into the registry of judgments until September 27, 1999. 
Considering that the Default Judgment was not deemed "entered" pursuant 
to Rule 58A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure until September 27, 1999, Mr. 
Kearns had until December 27, 1999, to file a motion to set aside the entry of 
default. Mr. Kearns' Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was filed on December 
27,1999, and, therefore, within the three-month time period required under U.R.C.P. 
Rule 60(b).1 
Wells Fargo's argument thatthe language of Rule 58A suggests that "once the 
Judge signs the Judgment and gives it to the court clerk (i.e., files it) that it is a final 
judgment regardless of when it is entered in the register of actions and the judgment 
docket" is not supported by any case law and contrary to U.R.C.P. 58A(c). 
In addition to the fact that Wells Fargo's timeliness issue lacks merit and is not 
supported by the record, Wells Fargo incorrectly suggests that the timeliness issue 
- - 1 , =i •, r . - « -
1
 Section 30-3-7 of the Utah Code lends further support for Mr. Kearns position. 
Utah Code Anno. § 30-3-7(1 )(a)(1994) provides, in pertinent part, that a decree of divorce 
becomes absolute: "[0]n the date it is signed by the court and entered by the clerk in the 
register of actions. . . ." 
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was not a basis of the trial court's ruling. (Br. of Appellee p. 14) The timeliness 
^ issue was ecificaily addressed in Mr. Kearns' Objection to Wells Fargo's Proposed 
Orders (R. 209-222) and in Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s Response to Mr. Kearns' 
Objection to Wells Fargo Bank's Proposed Orders (R. 223-?31).2 
Wells Fargo submitted two proposed orders and Mr. Kearns objected to the 
proposed orders because: (1) Wells Fargo's proposed order including an award of 
o 
attorneys' fees was not in conformity with the trial court's ruling because Wells Fargo 
was not awarded any attorney's fees; (2) Wells Fargo's proposed Order containing 
O attorneys' fees were clearly in excess of a reasonable fee; (3) Pursuant to U.R.C.P, 
58A, Mr, Kearns' Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was timely considering, the 
Default Judgment was signed by Judge Peuler on September 23, 1999, but it was 
neither filea by Judge Peuler's clerk nor entered into the Registry of Judgments until 
September 27, 1999. 
After considering the arguments advanced by the parties, Judge Peuler 
agreed with Mr. Kearns1 position as evidenced by the fact she signed the Order 
° Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment which did not include 
2
 Wells Fargo's Proposed Orders are attached as Addendum No. 1, Mr. Kearns' 
Objection to Wells Fargo Bank's Proposed Orders is attached as Addendum No. 2, and 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s Response to Michael J. Kearns' Objects m to Wells Fargo Bank's 
u proposed Orders is attached as Addendum No. 3. 
5 
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an award of attorneys' fees, combined with the in%lmeated changes she made on 
the Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment (R. 242). 
Paragraph 1 of the signed Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment provides' 
On December 27, 1999, Defendant filed a Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment which Judgment was signed by 
- > this Court September23,1999, and tjjed on September 
27, 1999. Defendant's Motion was accompanied by a 
supporting Memorandum of Defendant Michael Kearns. .-> 
(Emphasis added to designate Judge Peuler's interlineations)3 
Accordingly, Wells Fargo's statement that the timeliness issue was not a basis 
of the Trial Court's decision is clearly erroneous and designed to mislead this Court. 
— -r - POINT III - -
WELLS FARGO MISCONSTRUED THE 
APPLICABLE STANDARD O F REVIEW 
FOR DETERMINING WHETHER A 
DEFENSE IS MERITORIOUS 
Wells Fargo mischaracterized thisCourt'sdecision in Black's Title, Inc v. Utah 
State Ins. Dep't, 991 P.2d 607 (Utah Ct. App 199ft), to suggest that the applicable 
standard of review in determining whether a defense |S meritorious is really an abuse 
of discretion. Wells Fargo misconstrued this Court's decision in Black's Title and 
suggested that "this particular correctness standard has been applied so the Trial 
3
 A copy of the Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment 
is attached as Addendum No. 4 
6 
Court's decision will not be interfered with unless there is a clear showing of an 
abuse of its considerable discretion." Br. of Appellee at 3. *••?- ~r * 
Contrary to the present appeal, the parties in Black's Title did not dispute "that 
Black made a timely motion and asserted a meritorious defense." Black's Title, Inc. 
v. Utah State Ins. Dep% 991 P.2d at 610. The sole purpose of the review in Black's 
Title was to determine whether the "Commissioner erred in concluding that Black's 
default did not occur for reasons described in Rule 60(b)." Id. Given that the only 
issue involved on appeal was whether Black's default was due to excusable neglect, 
the appellate court was reviewing a question of fact and accordingly the applicable 
standard of review was abuse of discretion. 
If the sole issue in the present appeal was whether Mr. Kearns demonstrated 
excusable neglect, or defaulted for one of the other reasons described in Rule 60(b), 
then the applicable standard of review would be abuse of discretion. However, given 
that the parties in the subject appeal dispute whether Mr. Kearns' Rule 60(b) motion 
was timely, demonstrated excusable neglect, and that he had a meritorious defense, 
the standard of review articulated by this Court in Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State Ins. 
Dep't does not provide any guidance for the standard of review when determining 
the specific issue of whether a defense is meritorious, which presents a question of 
7 
Court's decision will not be interfered with unless there is a clear showing of an 
abuse of its considerable discretion." Br. of Appellee at 3. 
Contrary to the present appeal, the parties in Black's Title did not dispute "that 
Black made a timely motion and asserted a meritorious defense." Black's Title, Inc. 
v. Utah State Ins. Dep't, 991 P.2d at 610. The sole purpose of the review in Black's 
Title was to determine whether the "Commissioner erred in concluding that Black's 
default did not occur for reasons described in Rule 60(b)." Id. Given that the only 
issue involved on appeal was whether Black's default was due to excusable neglect, 
the appellate court was reviewing a question of fact and accordingly the applicable 
standard of review was abuse of discretion. . _ < " • • 
If the sole issue in the present appeal was whether Mr. Kearns demonstrated 
excusable neglect, or defaulted for one of the other reasons described in Rule 60(b), 
then the applicable standard of review would be abuse of discretion. However, given 
that the parties in the subject appeal dispute whether Mr. Kearns' Rule 60(b) motion 
was timely, demonstrated excusable neglect, and that he had a meritorious defense, 
the standard of review articulated by this Court in Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State Ins. 
Dep't does not provide any guidance for the standard of review when determining 
7 
the specific issue o^  vhether a defense is meritorious, which presents a question of 
l a w . 4 1 \' :. ±• -.r . 
Wells Fargo's statement of the applicable standard of review for determining 
whether a defense is meritorious is inherently incompatible and contrary to the Utah 
Supreme Court's designation of this issue as a question of law. In State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court clarified the distinction between 
the standard of review for issues of fact and questions of law: r- »-'• 
When it comes to reviewing trial court determinations of o *c» 
law, however, the standard of review is not phrased as 
•Mbnc-itfbfcTt- "clearly erroneous." Rather, appellate review of a trial > ir:': 
court's determination of the law is usually characterized by 
the term "correctness." Controlling Utah case law teaches ~& ^ 
that "correctness" means that the appellate court decides 
the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to -• -.. L -• 
the trial judge's determination of law. State v. Deli, 861 
.
J
, ;tc -SV ,,, P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); see Kennecott Corp. v. State 
Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 13841,1383 (Utah 1993). This is 
- '<u . because appellate courts have traditionally been seen as <*• -r 
having the power and duty to say what the law is and to 
VH : ••£! ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction. 
Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of 
• * Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 779 (1957); see 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1266 (Utah 1993), In 
otherwords, one can visualize the traditional standard-of- -'• ' 
review scheme as a continuum of deference anchored at 
4
 Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 1986), does not lend any support for Wells 
Fargo's interpretation of the applicable standard of review. The Katz decision preceded 
the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Erickson by eight years. For obvious reasons, the 
precedent set forth in Erickson provides controlling authority and dictates that the 
applicable standard of review for deciphering whether a defense is meritorious is a 
question of law, which the appellate court reviews for correctness. 
8 
V ' 
either end by the clearly erroneous and correction-of-error 
standards, which correspond with whether the issue is 
characterized as one of fact or of law. 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d at 936. •• • - . . 
- In Erickson v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, inc., 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994), 
the Utah Supreme Court clearly articulated the applicable standard of review for 
determining whether a defense is meritorious. "[T]he proper legal standard to be 
used by trial courts in determining whether a defense is meritorious is a question 
of law, which we review for correctness." Id. at 1148 (Emphasis added)(citing 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994)("Appellate courts have traditionally 
been seen as having the power and duty to say what the law is and to ensure that 
it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction)). r ^. -^' - *• 
In summary, whether a defense is meritorious is a question of law, which the 
appellate court reviews for correctness. Wells Fargo's contention that the applicable 
standard of review is abuse of discretion is unsupported by Utah case law and 
inherently incompatible. Mr. Kearns's meritorious defense is described in detail in 
the Brief of Appellant of Michael J. Kearns at 14-15. '*._> 
ft- • ,'i ' ' . r i . , ' ^ :• 
.<> • • 
~ru r-
9 
POINT IV 
PURSUANT TO RULE 24(a)(7) OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE 
PROCEDURE, MR. KEARNS SET FORTH 
A STATEMENT OF FACTS WITHIN HIS 
pESCRIPTION OF THE COURSE OF 
PROCEEDINGS 
Contrary to Wells Fargo's accusation that Mr. Kearns failed to set forth a 
statement of facts as required by U.R.C.P Rule 27(a)(7), which obviously is an 
incorrect reference, Mr. Kearns' Brief included a statement of facts, contained in hi£ 
description of the course of proceedings, which referenced the proceedings below" 
and were supported with citations to the record. U.R.A.P. Rule 24(a) addresses the 
form and content for appellant's brief. Rule 24(a)(7) provides: 
A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate 
briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, 
and its disposition in the court below. A statement of the 
facts relevant to the issues presented for review shall 
follow. All statements of fact and references to the 
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the 
r ( t record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this rule. 
U.R.A.P. 24(a)(7). 
Mr. Kearns concedes that his Brief did not include a separately designated 
statement of the facts, but it did include a recitation of the relevant facts in his 
description of the course of proceedings. Mr. Kearns's facts correctly referenced the 
proceedings below and were supported with citations to the record. 
L_-
10 
In addition to falsely accusing Mr. Kearns of omitting a statement of facts, 
paragraph 14 of Wells Fargo's recitation of the facts is not supported by the record. 
The Default Judgment was signed by Judge Sandra Peuler on September 23,1999, 
but was not fifed by the clerk nor entered into the Registry of Judgments until 
September 27, 1999. (R. 242) The trial court docket further supports Mr. Kearns' 
position that the Judgment was not filed by the clerk, nor entered into the Registry 
of Judgments until September 27, 1999.5 
In short, Wells Fargo falsely accused Mr. Kearns of failing to set forth a 
statement of facts and paragraph 14 of Wells Fargo's recitation of the facts is not 
supported by the record. 
POINT V 
MR. KEARNS' APPEAL IS WORTHY OF -
CONSIDERATION AND SHOULD NOT BE . -
SUBJECT TO THE CHILLING EFFECT OF 
RULE 33(a) SANCTIONS 
•- ~ • ' J * . 
Contrary to Wells Fargo's claim, Mr. Kearns' appeal is grounded in fact, 
warranted by existing law, and was not submitted for purposes of delay. In other 
words, Mr. Kearns' appeal is worthy of consideration and should not be subject to 
Rule 33(a) sanctions. Rule 33(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, 
in pertinent part: „..-- • -, " . . ,^  . .-, , -u. 0 ., . , 
5
 A copy of the court docket is attached as Addendum No. 5. 
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[I]f the court determines that a motion made 
or appeal taken under these rules is either 
frivolous or for delay, it shall award just 
damages, which may include single or double 
costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or 
reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing 
party. The court may order that the damages 
be paid by the party or by the party's 
attorney. 
U.R.A.P. 33(a)(1999). Subsection (b) defines the critical terms of frivolous and for 
delay as follows: 
For purposes of these rules, a frivolous 
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one 
that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by 
existing law, or not based on a good faith 
argument to extend, modify, or reverse 
existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or 
other paper interposed for the purpose of 
delay is one interposed for any improper 
purpose such as to harass, cause needless 
increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time 
that will benefit only the party filing the 
appeal, motion, brief, or other paper. 
U.R.A.P. 33(b)(1999). 
Sanctions for frivolous appeals should only be imposed in egregious cases, 
to avoid chilling the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions. However, Rule 
33(a) sanctions should be imposed when an appeal is obviously without any merit 
and has been taken with no reasonable likelihood of prevailing. Porco v. Porco, 752 
P.2d 365 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah Ct. App. 
12 
1989); see also Brigham City v. Mantua Town, 754 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Mr. Kearns' appeal should be granted. It is not an egregious case that 
warrants Rule 33(a) sanctions. Mr. Kearns' appeal is meritorious, factually based, 
and warranted by existing law. Moreover, Mr. Kearns' appeal was not filed for 
purposes of delay. Mr. Kearns has clearly demonstrated a proper motivation for 
filing this appeal; Mr. Kearns has counterclaims against Wells Fargo stemming from 
this dispute which may be precluded under the doctrines of res judicata or collateral 
estoppel if the default judgment is not set aside.6 
Wells Fargo's request for Rule 33(a) sanctions is yet another example of its 
repeated attempt to improperly collect costs and attorneys' fees from Mr. Kearns. 
Illustrative of this point is the fact that Wells Fargo improperly submitted an Order to 
the Trial Court including an award of attorneys' fees despite the fact that Judge 
Peuler's Court's Minute Entry did not award any attorneys' fees (R. 238-40). 
• 1 ) " • > ' 
' \ . ; , i . . . . i • - • ! . , ' • . *• i r . "!/.-
6
 Several policy arguments favorthe view that default judgments should not be given 
collateral estoppel/res judicata effect: (1) to do so misconceives the nature of default 
judgment, which "only admits for the purpose of the action the legality of the demand or 
claim in suit: and "does no make the allegations of the . . . complaint evidence in an action 
upon a different claim." Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 356 (1877); (2) the 
defendant should not be compelled to defend a suit which he otherwise would choose not 
to defend because of fear of its effect on future litigation; and (3) application of collateral 
estoppel in a default situation is unjust if it cannot b$ said that the parties could have 
reasonably foreseen the conclusive effect of their actions. These policy concerns are 
applicable to the present case. 
13 
Wells Fargo's improper tactics should not be condoned. Accordingly, this 
C jrt should find that Mr. Kearns' appeal is worthy of consideration and should not 
be subject to Rule 33(a) sanctions. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's denial of Mr. Kearns' Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment 
should be reversed and remanded, with instructions to set aside the default 
judgment and allow Mr. Kearns an opportunity to file an Answer or other appropriate 
response. 
Dated: August 9, 2000. 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
m 
i. Mantas 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
14 
1
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . -\ 
I certify that on August 10, 2000, two true and correct copies of the foregoing 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT MICHAEL J. KEARNS were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: * ;• ' 
Mark S. Swan v .*••• 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
-1
 'Os 
15 
Tabl 
MarkS. Swan-3873 
Shane W. Norris - 8097 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C 
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 561-4750 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT T 
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. 
. Jit t,'!5. ". 
' ' • ' Plaintiff, 
"V. 
MICHAEL J. KEARNS, 
Defendant. 
['- i ) • ->£ ^ O K ' ' M, f • ? 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990908206 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment came before this Court as a result of the 
parties' Notice to Submit. Plaintiff filed a principal Memorandum and Affidavit, Defendant filed 
a Responsive Memorandum and Plaintiff filed a Reply Memorandum. Though oral argument was 
requested, the Court finds that oral argument would not substantially assist the Court in making a 
ruling on Defendant's Motion. Therefore, the Court having fully reviewed Defendant's Motion and 
the resulting pleadings, along with the Court record in this matter, the Court hereby enters the 
following ruling: 
00_37073CECwpd 
1. On December 27,1999, Defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment, 
which Judgment was signed by this Court December 23, 1999. Defendant's Motion was 
accompanied by a supporting Memorandum of Defendant Michael Keams. 
2. Defendant asserted that his failure to respond to Plaintiffs Complaint in a timely 
fashion was due to excusable neglect as that term is set forth in Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. , . 
3- Defendant has failed to show excusable neglect. 
4. Defendant has further failed to show that he has a meritorious defense to the matters 
raised in Plaintiff s Complaint. Particularly, the Defendant' s chim that the matter should have been 
arbitrated is not persuasive as the arbitration provision under the Note sued upon by Plaintiff 
required a formal election of arbitration to be made by Defendant before the Court in the civil action, 
which did not occur in this case. 
5. Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment is Denied. 
6. Defendant's Motion having been brought without merit and contrary to the facts 
known to Defendant, and therefore being in bad faith, entitles Plaintiff to its attorney's fees in the 
sum of $5,404.00, which are hereby awarded to Plaintiff a.s an additional Judgment against 
Defendant. ' 
DATED this day of February, 2000. : ' 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE SANDRA N. PEULER 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the fp day of February, 2000,1 caused a true and unsigned correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following by placing the same in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid and addressed as follows: 
Mark A. Larsen 
Jerome H. Mooney III 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
50 West Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
A 
- CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of February, 2000,1 caused a true and signed correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following by placing the same in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid and addressed as follows: "•<-' ' '-- .* - '-•: " 
M a r k A. L a r s e n ' J J ' - ^ - ' 
Jerome H. Mooney III 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW "• 
50 West Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 • •' '! 
Mark S. Swan ' \ 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450 
Midvale, Utah 84047-4139 
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MarkS. Swan-3873 
Shane W. Norris - 8097 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 561-4750 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Wells Fargo Bank, NA. 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL J. KEARNS, " " 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990908206 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment came before this Court as a result of the 
parties' Notice to Submit. Plaintiff filed a principal Memorandum and Affidavit, Defendant filed . 
a Responsive Memorandum and Plaintiff filed a Reply Memorandum. Though oral argument was > 
requested, the Court finds that oral argument would not substantially assist the Court in making a 
ruling on Defendant's Motion. Therefore, the Court having fully reviewed Defendant's Motion and 
the resulting pleadings, along with the Court record in this matter, the Court hereby enters the 
following ruling: 
00_37266.CEC.wpd 
1. On December 27,1999, Defendant filed a Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment, 
which Judgment was signed by this Court December 23, 1999. Defendant's Motion was 
accompanied by a supporting Memorandum of Defendant Michael Kearns. 
2. Defendant asserted that his failure to respond to Plaintiffs Complaint in a timely 
fashion was due to excusable neglect as that term is set forth in Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
3. Defendant has failed to show excusable neglect. 
4. Defendant has further failed to show that he has a meritorious defense to the matters 
raised in Plaintiffs Complaint.
 v 
5. Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment is Denied. 
DATED this day of February, 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE SANDRA N. PEULER 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
00_37266.CEC.wpd 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2,3 day of February, 2000,1 caused a true and unsigned correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following by placing the same in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid and addressed as follows: ".':-
Mark A. Larsen 
Jerome H. Mooney III 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
50 West Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 " -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of February, 2000,1 caused a true and signed correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following by placing the same in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid and addressed as follows: 
Mark A. Larsen 
Jerome H. Mooney III 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
50 West Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Mark S. Swan 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450 
Mid vale, Utah 84047-4139 
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MARK A. LARSEN(3727) 
JEROME H. MOONEY 111 (2303) 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
50 West Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801)364-6500 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 
Plaintiff, 
v 
MICHAEL J. KEARNS, 
Defendant. 
MR. KEARNS' OBJECTION TO 
WELLS FARGO BANK'S PROPOSED 
^ - ORDERS 
(Oral Argument Requested) -
Civil No. 990908206 
"• ' V'° Judge Sandra Peuler - ' 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, Defendant 
Michael J. Kearns ("Mr. Kearns") submits the foliowing Objection to Wells Fargo Bank's 
Proposed Orders: 
INTRODUCTION -
On February 10, 2000, Plaintiff Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. ("Wells Fargo") submitted 
a proposed Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, and 
simultaneously submitted an alternative proposed order which included an award of 
©FY 
attorneys' fees despite the fact that this Court's Minute Entry did not award attorneys' fees. 
A copy of the Court's Minute Entry, dated January 31, 2000, is attached as Exhibit A. 
Not only is it improper for Wells Fargo to submit an Order including attorneys' fees, 
considering that it is not in conformity with this Court's ruling, the amount requested is 
clearly in excess of a reasonable fee. 
Additionally, Mr. Kearns objects to paragraph 1 because the Default Judgment was 
signed by this Court on September 23, 1999, not December 23, 1999, as stated in 
paragraph 1 of the proposed Orders. Further, paragraph 1 should reflect, in accordance 
with the court docket in this case, that the Default Judgment was not filed until September 
27,1999. A copy of the relevant portion of the court docket in the present case is attached 
as Exhibit B.
 A , :, 
Moreover, Mr. Kearns objects to paragraph 4 on the basis that Mr. Kearns was not 
required to formally elect binding arbitration of this dispute. Rather, the Binding Arbitration 
provision expressly provided that all disputes were required to be resolved by binding 
arbitration rather than in court. Further, Mr. Kearns objects to paragraph 4 because he 
does in fact have a meritorious defense predicated upon lender liability, which if 
successful, would have resulted in a judgment different from the one entered against him. 
Accordingly, Mr. Kearns objects to the proposed Orders Denying Defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. 
2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WELLS FARGO's PROPOSED ORDER INCLUDING AN 
AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES IS NOT IN CONFORMITY 
WITH THIS COURT'S RULING BECAUSE WELLS FARGO ' 
O WAS NOT AWARDED ANY ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration provides, in pertinent Dart: 
"In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party 
.. obtaining the ruling shal l . . . file with the court 
a proposed order . . . in conformity with the 
ruling." 
(Emphasis added). 
Wells Fargo's proposed Order including attorney's fees is not in conformity with this 
Court's ruling. This Court ruled, in its Minute Entry, dated January 31, 2000, "[t]he 
,
 t defendant's Motion is denied for the reasons and upon the bases as set forth in plaintiff's 
Memorandum." The ruling did not award Wells Fargo its attorneys' fees and is silent as 
to Plaintiffs procedurally improper request for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the Utah 
° Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Wells Fargo's request for Rule 11 sanctions against Mr. Kearns was without merit 
• *-« 
and procedurally improper under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 11(1)(A) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part: 
A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be 
made separately from other motions or 
requests and shall describe the specific 
conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It 
shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall 
not be filed with or presented to the court 
3 
unless, within 21 days after service of the 
motion (or such other period as the court may 
prescribe), the challenged paper, ciaim, defense, 
contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn 
or appropriately corrected. 
(Emphasis added) U.R.C.P. 11(1)(A)(1999). 
Wells Fargo improperly combined its Memorandum in Opposition to Mr. Kearns' 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment with its Request for Attorneys' Fees. Additionally, 
Wells Fargo immediately filed the motion with this Court rather than waiting the mandatory 
21-day time period. Given these significant deficiencies, combined with the fact that the 
Court's ruling does not include an award of attorneys' fees, it is absurd for Wells Fargo to 
submit the proposed Order including attorneys' fees. 
Wells Fargo's proposed Order, containing an award of attorneys' fees, is yet another 
example of its repeated tactics to harass Mr. Kearns. This Court should not condone this 
harassment and should sustain Mr. Kearns' objections to the proposed Order containing 
an award of attorneys' fees. , - . . --- ' 
POINT II 
IN ADDITION TO FAILING TO CONFORM 
WITH THIS COURT'S RULING, WELLS 
FARGO'S PROPOSED ORDER CONTAINING 
ATTORNEYS' FEES IS CLEARLY IN EXCESS 
OF A REASONABLE FEE 
Wells Fargo's proposed Order, containing attorneys' fees, requests attorneys' fees 
and costs in the sum of $5,404.00. This amount is clearly excessive. Rule 1.5 of the 
4 
Rules of Professional Conduct requires attorneys to charge reasonable fees for the 
services rendered. Rule 1.5(a) provides, in pertinent part: 
A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, 
charge or collect an illegal or clearly excessive 
fee. A fee is clearly excessive when, after a 
review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary 
prudence would be left with a definite and firm 
conviction that the fee is in excess of a 
reasonable fee. , Factors to be considered as 
guides in determining the reasonableness of the . 
fee include the following: 
(1) The time and labor required, the 
:
- -* novelty and difficulty of the questions 
involved and the skill requisite to perform 
the legal service properly . . . . 
R. of Prof I Conduct 1.5(a). 
Wells Fargo's attorney expended a total of 39.80 hours to prepare a memorandum 
in opposition to Defendant's Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment. This is not a 
reasonable amount of time for such legal services. A lawyer of ordinary prudence would 
conclude that the time Wells Fargo's counsel spent on preparing this memorandum was 
not reasonable. Additionally, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would conclude that $31.00 
for certified copies was both unreasonable and unnecessary. 
. < i * 
POINT III 
WELL$ FARGO's PROPOSED ORDERS CONTAINS 
FACTUALLY INCORRECT STATEMENTS TO WHICH MR. 
KEARNS OBJECTS 
A, Mr. Kearns Specifically Objects to the Factually Incorrect Statements in 
Paragraph 1 of Wells Fargo's Proposed Orders 
Mr. Kearns objects to paragraph 1 because the Default Judgment was signed by 
this Court on September 23,1999, not December 23,1999, as stated in paragraph 1 of the 
proposed Orders. 
Further, paragraph 1 should reflect, in accordance with the court docket in this case, 
thatthe Default Judgment was not ff/ed until September 27,1999. Rule 58A(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in relevant part: 
When judgment entered; notation in register of 
actions and judgment docket. A judgment is 
complete and shall be deemed entered for all 
purposes .. .when the same is signed and filed ~' 
§s herein above provided. The clerk shall 
immediately make a notation of the Judgment in ~' " -
the register of actions and the judgment docket. 
(Emphasis added) U.R.C.P. 58A(c)(1999). Under Rule 58A(c) "a judgment is complete 
and deemed entered for all purposes when the same is signed and filed." In re Bundy's 
Estate v. Bundy\ 241 p.2d 462, 467 (Utah 1952). 
The court docket in this case reflects that even though Judge Peuler signed the 
Default Judgment on September 23, 1999, it was not filed by Judge Peuler's clerk nor 
entered into the registry of judgments until September 27, 1999. 
6 
Considering that the Default Judgment was not deemed "entered" pursuant to Rule 
O 58Aofthe Utah Rules of Civil Procedure until September 27, 1999, Mr, Kearns had until 
December 27, 1999, to file a motion to set aside the entry of default. Mr. Kearns' Motion 
to Set Aside Default Judgment was filed on December 27,1999, and, therefore, within the 
O 
three month time period required under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
B. Mr. Kearns Specifically Objects to the Factually Incorrect Statements in 
Paragraph 4 of Wells Fargo's Proposed Orders 
First, Mr. Kearns objects to paragraph 4 of Wells Fargo's proposed Orders on the 
basis that the Binding Arbitration provision contained in the Loan Agreement did not require 
Mr. Kearns to formally elect binding arbitration. Instead, the Binding Arbitration provision 
expressly provided that the only form of dispute resolution these parties agreed to was 
binding arbitration. The Loan Agreement contains the following binding arbitration 
t ' provision: 
(1) Binding Arbitration. You agree that any Dispute not 
resolved informally, regardless of when it arose, will be settled 
in accordance with the terms of the Arbitration Program at the 
election of any party. A "Dispute" shall include any dispute, ; 
claim or controversy of any kind involving you or us, whether 
in contract or in tort, legal or equitable, now existing or 
hereafter arising, relating in any way to this Agreement or any 
related agreements (the "Documents"), or any past, present or • 
future loans, services, agreements, relationships, incidents or 
injuries of any kind whatsoever relating to or involving the 
Private Banking Group or any successor group or department 
of Lender. Any party to a Dispute may by summary , 
proceeding bring any action in court to compel arbitration of 
any Dispute. Any party who fails to submit to binding 
arbitration following a lawful demand by the opposing party 
shall bear all costs and expenses incurred by the opposing 
party in compelling arbitration of any Dispute. The parties 
agree that by engaging in activities with or involving each other 
7 
as described above, they are participating in transactions 
involving interstate commerce. THE PARTIES UNDERSTAND 
THAT THEIR DISPUTES SHALL BE RESOLVED BY 
BINDING ARBITRATION RATHER THAN IN COURT, AND 
ONCE DECIDED BY ARBITRATION NO DISPUTE CAN 
LATER BE BROUGHT, FILED OR PURSUED IN COURT 
BEFORE A JUDGE OR JURY. 
Secondly, Mr. Kearns objects to paragraph 4 because he does in fact have a 
meritorious defense predicated upon lender liability which, if successful, would have 
resulted in a judgment different that the one entered against him. The lead opinion in 
Musselman held, "A meritorious defense is one which sets forth specific and sufficiently 
detailed facts which, if proven, would have resulted in a judgment different from the one 
entered." State ex rel. Dep't of Soc. Serv.v. Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053 (Utah 
1983)(plurality opinion)(quoting Lopez v. Reserve Ins. Co., 525 P.2d 1204,1206 (Colo. Ct. 
App. 1974). 
Although Mr. Kearns has never refuted that he owed Wells Fargo $250,000.00, plus 
interest, he does dispute the Wells Fargo's choice of venue as well as the attorneys' fees 
and court costs. Further, the amount of money Mr. Kearns owed to Wells Fargo may be 
offset in whole or in part, or may even be exceeded, by Mr. Kearns's lender liability claims 
against Wells Fargo. * • : . i • • • = 
'•'• ' CONCLUSION 
,^V ~ ' . s" ^ • 
Mr. Kearns objects to Wells Fargo's proposed Orders for the following reasons: 
> Wells Fargo's proposed Order including attorneys' fees is not in conformity 
with this Court's ruling; 
—_ ' - ' > -^  
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> Weils Fargo's proposed Order containing attorneys' fees is clearly in excess 
of a reasonable fee; 
> Mr. Kearns objects to paragraph 1 because the Default Judgment was 
signed by this Court on September 23, 1999, not December 23, 1999, as 
stated in paragraph 1 of the proposed Orders; 
> Paragraph 1 should reflect, in accordance with the court docket in this case, 
'" that the Default Judgment was not filed until September 27, 1999; 
> Mr. Kearns objects to paragraph 4 of Wells Fargo's proposed Orders on the 
basis that the Binding Arbitration provision contained in the Loan Agreement 
did not require Mr. Kearns to formally elect binding arbitration; and 
> Mr. Kearns further objects to paragraph 4 because he does in fact have a 
meritorious defense predicated upon lender liability, which, if successful, 
would have resulted in a judgment different that the one entered against him. 
9 
- REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501 (3)(b) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Mr. Kearns 
requests oral argument on his Objection to Weils Fargo Bank's Proposed Orders. 
Dated: February 17,2000. ' "* ' 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
lark_A. Larsen 
Jerome H. Mooney 
Attorneys for Defendant 
&l#k-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
f certify that on February 17, 2000, a true ancf correct copy of MR. KEARNS' 
OBJECTION TO WELLS FARGO BANK'S PROPOSED ORDERS was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Mark S. Swan 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
o > -
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
*»;-IK AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH n 
V:\ 
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL J. KEARNS, 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. 990908206 
Before the Court is a Notice to Submit for Decision on 
defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. The Court having 
reviewed the pleadings filed in this matter, now enters the 
following ruling. 
The defendant's Motion is denied for the reasons and upon the 
bases as set forth in plaintiff's Memorandum. Although oral 
argument was requested, the Court has reviewed all of the pleadings 
filed in connection with this lawsuit and oral argument would not 
substantially assist the Court in rendering its ruling. 
Counsel for plaintiff is directed to prepare an Order 
consistent with this ruling. 
Dated this ?) I day of January, 2000. 
SANDRA N. PEULFR 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
EXHIBIT 
A 
o 
o 
o 
o 
O 
WELLS FARGO V. KEARNS PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this_| day of .January, 
2000: 
Mark S. Swan 
Shane W. Norris 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
6925 S. Union Park Center, Suite 450 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Mark A. Larsen 
Jerome H. Mooney III 
Attorneys for Defendant 
50 W. Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
^LCMPU^ 
3 NUMBER 990908206 D e b t CcL_ a c t i o n 
Amount C r e d i t : 0 . 0 0 
B a l a n c e : ° - 0 0 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: GARNISHMENT 
A m o u n t ' P u e : 2 0 . 0 0 
Amount P a d d : 2 0 . 0 0 
Amount C r e d i t : 0 • ° P 
B a l a n c e : 0 . 0 0 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: WRIT OF EXECUTION 
Amount Due: 2 0.00 
Amount Paid: 20.00 
Amount Credit: °•°° 
Balance: - °-00 
5E NOTE 
JCEEDINGS 
-09-99 Case filed by jamess 
-13-99 Judge PEULER assigned. 
-13-99 Filed: Complaint 10K-MORE 
-13-99 Fee Account created Total Due: _ i^ u 
-13-99 COMPLAINT 10K-MORE Payment *ecGJj-ve^T; 
Note: Code Description: COMPLAINT 10K-MORE 
-03-99 Filed return: Summons (20 day) on return 
Party Served: KEARNS, MICHAEL J 
Service Date: August 23, 1999 
-22-99 Filed: Affidavit of Attorney's Fees and Costs 
-22-99 Filed: Default Certificate 
-22-99 Default Judgment sent to Judge Peuler 
-23-99 Filed order: Default Judgment 
Judge speuler • 
Signed September 23, 199S 
-23-99 Case Disposition is Jdmt default clerk 
Disposition Judge is SANDRA PEULER 
-27-99 Judgment #1 Entered 
Creditor: WELLS FARGO BANK NA 
Debtor: MICHAEL J KEARNS 
266,351.85 Principal 
5,094.18 Interest 
944.00 Attorneys Fee's 
272,390.03 Judgment Grand Total 
-27-99 Filed judgment: Default Judgment @ 
Judge speuler 
Signed September 23, 1999 
-30-99 Issued: Abstract of Judgment 
Clerk nancyka 
:inted: 10/05/99 11:17:43 P*9e 2 
Tab 3 
MarkS. Swan-3873 
Shane W. Norris - 8097 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 561-4750 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
• Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. •! .<*. 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL J. KEARNS, 
Defendant. 
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.'s 
RESPONSE TO MICHAEL J. 
KEARNS' OBJECTION TO WELLS 
FARGO BANK'S PROPOSED 
ORDERS 
Civil No. 990908206 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
Plaintiff WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. ("Wells Fargo") hereby submits the following 
Response to Defendant Michael J. Kearns ("Defendant") Obj ection to Wells Fargo Bank's Proposed 
Order: 
.T ' 
INTRODUCTION 
.•nl . 'fc 
On January 31, 2000, this Court entered a Minute Entry denying Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment. This Court indicated that the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment was 
denied based upon "the reasons and upon the bases as set forth in plaintiffs Memorandum." 
00_37262.CET. wpd 
Defendant is attempting to again argue the merits of his Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment in 
his Objection to Wells Fargo's proposed Orders. •.' 1 (.»*•" " i •< - .-- *- *• 
In its original memorandum relied upon by the Court, Wells Fargo set forth three separate 
reasons to deny Defendant's Motion to Set Aside. The first was that Defendant's failure to answer 
the subject complaint was not due to excusable neglect. The second reason was that Defendant did 
not have a meritorious defense to the subject action. The third reason was the Defendant failed to 
file the Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment within three months in violation of Rule 60(b), 
U.R.Civ.P. and even if timely filed, Defendant failed to file the motion within a reasonable time. 
The proposed order submitted to this Court accurately reflects the reasons and bases set forth in 
Plaintiffs memorandum which were adopted by this Court. 
Additionally, Wells Fargo claimed in it's Memorandum that Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside Default Judgment was brought in bad faith and requested an award of attorney's fees and 
sanctions based upon Defendant filing a sworn Affidavit which was filled with inaccuracies, 
falsifications of facts and outright deception. The Minute Entry did not deny Wells Fargo's request 
for attorneys fees, but did not indicate whether attorney's fees were awarded. Therefore, Wells 
Fargo submitted two orders to this Court to allow for the award of attorneys fees if this Court 
determined sanctions were in order, and in the alternative a separate order not including attorneys. 
Plaintiff believes Defendant intentionally attempted to deceive and mislead this Court and an award 
of attorneys fees is still appropriate in this matter. 
Plaintiff will address Defendant's objections to the proposed form of the Order in 
Defendant's order of argument. 
00_3726ZCEC.wpd 2 
ARGUMENT 
I. WELLS FARGO IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS FEES BASED UPON 
DEFENDANT'S ATTEMPT TO DECEIVE AND MISLEAD THIS COURT. 
While the Court adopted Plaintiffs memorandum in denying Defendant's Motion, the 
Minute Entry does not address the attorney's fees requested as a sanction for Defendants attempt to 
deceive this Court through his swom affidavit. Therefore, Wells Fargo provided this Court with two 
Orders, one including the award of attorneys fees and one excluding the award of attorneys fees. 
Defendant is now attempting to argue the merits of the award of attorneys fees after this Court has 
already ruled on the failed Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment, and is again attempting to mislead 
this Court by misrepresenting the substance of Wells Fargo's request for attorneys fees. 
Defendant claims that Wells Fargo requested attorneys fees only under Rule 11, and such 
request was procedurally improper. In reality, Wells Fargo requested attorneys fees under §78-27-
56(1) Utah Code Ann.. Rule 11, U.R.Civ.P.. and under this Courts' inherent power to impose 
monetary sanctions on a litigant for wasting judicial resources. Although Rule 11 does carry some 
procedural aspects with the imposition of attorneys fees, Wells Fargo did not limit its request for 
attorneys fees to this rule, and did not indicate in the proposed order that attorneys fees were awarded 
under Rule 11. In fact, Wells Fargo indicates in the proposed order that the attorneys fees were 
based upon Defendant's Motion having been brought without merit, and contrary to the facts known 
to Defendant and in bad faith. Under Utah law, this Court has authority to award attorneys fees 
because of Defendant's meritless action. 
Not only does this Court has authority to award attorneys fees under §78-27-56(1) Utah Code 
Ann-, and Rule 11, U.R.Civ.P.. but also under this Courts' inherent powers to impose monetary 
3 
00_37262 CEC wpd J 
sanctions for a wasting of judicial resources. The Utah Supreme Court recently held that a judge 
"did not purport to act under rule 11, but rather exercised the court's inherent powers to impose 
• "" . 1 - : . . ' " • . • 
monetary sanctions on an attorney for wasting judicial resources when he granted attorney 
fees " Griffith v. Griffith. 376 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 25 (1999) (emphasis added) (holding that 
Judge Dever had inherent authority to award attorneys fees outside of Rule 11 because a motion was 
without merit). The Utah Supreme Court held that, although Rule 11 sanctions were requested in 
the matter, because Judge Dever changed the order to state that the motion was without merit, this 
was an exercise of the court's inherent powers to award attorneys fees for sanctions and did not fall 
under Rule 11. Id. Therefore, regardless of Defendant's attempt to mislead this Court into believing 
that Wells Fargo's request for attorneys fees was procedurally improper, this Court has inherent 
authority to award attorneys fees in light of Defendant's egregious behavior, and should do so. 
II. WELLS FARGO's ATTORNEYS FEES INCURRED IN OPPOSING 
DEFENDANT'S BASELESS AND DECEPTIVE MOTION TO SET ASIDE 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT ARE REASONABLE. 
Defendant claims in his Objection to Wells Fargo Bank's Proposed Orders that the attorneys 
fees incurred by Wells Fargo in responding to Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment 
are not reasonable. Plaintiff believes they are reasonable. Although the amount of hours spent 
responding to Defendant's Motion to Set Aside are higher than normal for responding to a motion 
of this type, Wells Fargo's attorneys were forced to spend an excessive amount of time attempting 
to dispute the deceptions which were contained throughout the Motion to Set Aside and the 
accompanying Affidavit of Michael Keams. Wells Fargo was forced to obtain numerous pleadings 
from a separate action which the current attorneys had no involvement in, and exhaustively restate 
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the facts and law to counter the false statements which were throughout Defendant's Motion to Set 
Aside. Further, Plaintiff had to present to the Court a five-month course of conduct by Defendant 
which was not part of the court record. These efforts were absolutely necessary to provide a true 
picture in showing that there was no excusable neglect and no meritorious defense. Defendant's 
objection to the costs incurred for certified copies is also meritless, as these copies, which were 
provided to the Court, contained the very evidence of Defendant's misrepresentation regarding the 
facts. 
In light of being forced to dispute numerous inconsistencies and falsehoods which were 
contained in Defendant's Motion, Affidavit and Memorandum, the amount of time spent by Wells 
Fargo's attorneys in preparing a comprehensive Opposition to the Motion to Set Aside was 
reasonable under the circumstances. Therefore, this Court should find that fees incurred in this 
matter were reasonable. rt'iOW). IR31* ."i". .MT ': u/" ' . / ; 
III. THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT WAS SIGNED BY THIS COURT ON 
SEPTEMBER 23,1999. 
Defendant's Point III claims that there is a factually incorrect statement in Wells Fargo's 
proposed Order. The language in the proposed Order refers to the date that the underlying default 
judgment was "signed". There is no reference in the proposed Order to the word "filed". There can 
be no dispute that the underlying Default Judgment was in fact signed on September 23,1999, and 
the reference in the proposed Order to that date is merely an identification of the Order which 
Defendant was moving to set aside. Thus, it is not quite clear why Defendant objects to this 
statement in the Order. A finding regarding the timeliness of Defendant's objection was not made 
part of the proposed Order. Consequently, Plaintiff believes the Court should ignore this objection 
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by Defendant as being non-meritorious and another attempt by Defendant to deflect this Court from 
the simple issues involved in this matter. - - '• 
Notwithstanding this, Defendant's argument with the Oder is also without substantive merit. 
Plaintiff believes the default judgment was signed and "filed" by September 23, 1999. Defendant 
alleges that the default judgment was not entered into the "registry of judgments" until September 
27, 1999. However that has no bearing on when the default judgment was "filed" by this Court'. 
Rule 58A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure state that "[a] judgment is complete and shall be 
deemed entered for all purposes. . . when the same is signed and filed as herein above provided." 
The default judgment is stamped as filed by this Court on September 23, 1999. Therefore, 
Defendant did not file the Motion to Set Aside within three months as required and this Court could 
choose to make that a basis for denying Defendant's Motion.2 
IV. DEFENDANT DOES NOT HAVE A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE TO THE 
SUBJECT ACTION. 
t-r t*. \ 
Defendant is again attempting to argue the merits of his Motion to Set Aside Default 
Judgment in Objecting to the proposed orders submitted to this Court. As stated above, this Court 
indicated in its Minute Order that Defendant's Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment "is denied for 
the reasons and upon the bases set forth in plaintiffs Memorandum." Wells Fargo claimed in the 
1
 The reference to registry of judgments has been clarified by § 78-22-1.5, Utah Code Ann., 
as the time a judgment becomes a lien on real property as the result of a Judgment Information 
Statement. However, for finality purposes, the Default Judgment is entered when stamped by the 
court as being filed. Rule 58A(c1. U.R.Civ.P. 
2
 Defendant correctly points out that Wells Fargo mistakenly stated that the Default Judgment 
was signed by this Court on December 23, 1999. Wells Fargo is including a revised Order which 
indicates the correct date of September 23, 1999. 
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Opposition to Defendant's Motion that Defendant did not have a meritorious defense to the subject 
claim. Since this Court has already found that Defendant does not have a meritorious defense to the 
subject claim, Defendant's argument with the Order must be without merit, unless it goes solely to 
the form of the Order. 
Presumably, Defendant objects to the proposed Order because it makes reference to the 
arbitration provision. If this is an unnecessary reference, then Plaintiff has submitted with this 
Memorandum proposed Orders that eliminates this reference. Plaintiff believes that the reference 
in the proposed Order is correct. Even in the language the Defendant quotes regard: ng the arbitration 
provision on page 7 of his Memorandum states that "any Dispute. . . will be settled in accordance 
with the terms of the Arbitration Program at the election of any party.. .Any party to a dispute may 
by summary proceeding bring any action in Court to compel arbitration of any dispute." Thus, 
contrary to Defendant's current representation to the Court, the Order is not factually incorrect 
because the contract between the parties provides that the arbitration provision only comes into 
effect when an election is made by a party. Defendant never made such an election and cannot 
belatedly make an election after the default judgment has been entered. 
Lastly, Defendant attempts to claim that the so called lender liability claims against Wells 
Fargo constituted a meritorious defense is another improper objection. Defendant never set forth 
any facts which would support his alleged claim of lender liability and barely mentioned the claim 
in his Motion to Set Aside Default or in his reply. Defendant's feeble attempt to oppose the form 
of the proposed Order by arguing a meritorious defense after failing with the Arbitration defense in 
objecting to the proposed order is absurd. This Court has held that Defendant did not have a 
00_37262.CEC.wpd 7 
meritorious defense to the subject matter. Therefore, Defendant's newest attempt to convince this 
Court of an adequate defense is improper and should be denied. • -
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's objections to the Proposed Orders submitted by Wells Fargo are all baseless and 
without merit. This Court held in the Minute Entry that Defendant's Motion to Set Aside is denied 
based upon the reasons set forth in Wells Fargo's Opposition. The Proposed Orders simply set forth 
the reasons which were given in the Opposition. As an accommodation to resolving the Order as 
soon as possible, Plaintiff has also deleted the reference to the arbitration provision in the Order. 
Plaintiff requests the Court to deny Defendant's objections to the Order, and sign and enter the 
Order. The only question properly before this Court is whether attorneys fees should be awarded. 
Because the Court's Minute Entry was silent on the issue, Wells Fargo again submits two Proposed 
Orders for this Court convenience on this issue. Plaintiff urges the Court to award attorneys fees in 
light of the deceptive nature 0/Defendant's Motion to set Aside the Default Judgment. 
lis J^ DATED th  >— day of February, 2000. 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
irk S.^wan 
Attorney for Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Z 3 day of February, 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to be served upon the following by placing the same in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid and addressed as follows: 
Mark A. Larsen 
Jerome H. Mooney III 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
50 West Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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MarkS. Swan-3873 
Shane W. Norris - 8097 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 561-47^0 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Wells Fargo Bar*' N-A-
IN THE TtfIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALf LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
WELLS FARGO BANK, 
Plaintiff 
V. 
MICHAEL J. KEARNS, 
Defendant. 
N.A. ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 990908206 
Judge Sandra Peuler 
Defendant's Motion t 0 Set Aside Default Judgment came before this Court as a result of the 
parties' Notice to Submit- Plaintiff filed a principal Memorandum and Affidavit, Defendant filed 
a Responsive Memorandum a n - Plaintiff filed a Reply Memorandum. Though oral argument was 
requested, the Court finds that oral argument would not substantially assist the Court in making a 
ruling on Defendant's MO^on. Therefore, the Court having fully reviewed Defendant's Motion and 
the resulting pleadines along with the Court record in this matter, the Court hereby enters the 
following ruling: 
" i L . u ,s- . . . . . , «. '_* <B-»i. t 
Thiiv J . ; ic:_: L-''.trict 
S1!-.! LA. 
By. 
U.p^v c:3/k 
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1. On December 27,1999, Defendant filed aMotion to Set Aside the Default Judgment, u niea a Motion to Set Aside tne Uetauit Judgment, 
Sep*" OA*2 ftUJ^ ^falA^ 
which Judgment was signed by this Court Dceombcr 23, 1999. Defendant's Motion was 
accompanied by a supporting Memorandum of Defendant Michael Kearns. 
2. Defendant asserted that his failure to respond to Plaintiffs Complaint in a timely 
fashion was due to excusable neglect as that term is set forth in Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. , . 
3. Defendant has failed to show excusable neglect. 
4. Defendant has further failed to show that he has a meritorious defense to the matters 
raised in PlaintifFs Complaint. Particularly, the Defendant's claim that the matter should have been 
arbitrated is not persuasive as the arbitration provision under the Note sued upon by Plaintiff 
required a formal election of arbitration to be made by Defendant before the Court in the civil action, 
which did not occur in this case. 
5. Defendant's Motion to set Aside the Default Judgment is denied, 
DATED this ( day of February, 2000. 
BY THE COURT; . 
HONORABLE SANDRA N. PEULER 
Third Judicial District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVIrF 
I hereby certify that on the _ fO day of February, 2000,1 caused a true and unsigned correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following by placing the same in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid and addressed as follows: 
Mark A. Larsen 
Jerome H. Mooney HI 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
50 West Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of February, 20Q0,1 caused a true and signed correct 
copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following by placing the same in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid and addressed as follows: 
Mark A. Larsen 
Jerome H. Mooney III 
LARSEN & MOONEY LAW 
50 West Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Mark S. Swan 
RICHER, SWAN & OVERHOLT, P.C. 
6925 South Union Park Center, Suite 450 
Midvale, Utah 84047-4139 
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Tab 5 
E NUMBER 990908206 Debt Co"-_ Action 
Amount Credit: 0-°° 
Balance: °-uu 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: GARNISHMENT 
Amount'pue: 20.00 
Amount Padd: 2 0.00 
Amount Credit: u. 
Balance: Q- u u 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: WRIT OF EXECUTION 
Amount Due: 20.00 
Amount Paid: 20.00 
Amount Credit: u. 
Balance: u- u u 
£E NOTE 
.OCEEDINGS 
jamess 
i-09-99 Case filed by jamess jamess 
i-13-99 Judge PEULER assigned. jamess 
i-13-99 Filed: Complaint 10K-MORE
 l 2 ^ 0 0 j a m e s s 
1-13-99 Fee Account created ^°^±L Received: 120.00 jamess 
i-13-99 COMPLAINT 10K-MORE Paym®SL???wr 10K MORE 
Note: Code Description: f ^ ™ ^ ° K M ° R E devonyag 
3-03-99 Filed return: Summons (20 day) R e t u r n ae o y g 
Party Served: KEARNSf MICHAEL J 
Service Date: August 23, iy»»
 rrte.tt, devonvacr 
9-22-99 Filed: Affidavit .of Attorney's Fees and Costs devonya! 
3-22-99 Filed: Default Certificate devonyag 
1-22-99 Default Judgment sent to Judge Peuie- Icathvq 
9-23-99 Filed order: Default Judgment 
Judge speuler 
Signed September 23,-199^ kathya 
9-23-99 Case Disposition is Jdmt default cleric ' kathva 
Disposition Judge is SANDRA PEULER alicew 
9-27-99 Judgment #1 Entered 
Creditor: WELLS FARGO BANK NA 
Debtor: MICHAEL J KEARNS 
266,351.85 Principal 
5,094.18 Interest 
944.00 Attorneys Fee's 
272,390.03 Judgment Grand Total alicew 
9-27-99 Filed judgment: Default Judgment Q 
Judge speuler 
Signed September 23, 1999 nancyka 
9-30-99 Issued: Abstract of Judgment J 
Clerk nancyka 
u 
Tinted: 10/05/99 11:17:48 Pa9S 

